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ABSTRACT: Recent work in feminist and postcolonial rhetoric demonstrates various meanings of silence 
(Glenn 2004). Listening rhetorically in order to comprehend silences (Ratcliffe 2006) is particularly 
difficult in scientific contexts, I argue, because the common ground for scientific discourse assumes a 
culture of disclosure. Rhetorical listening is also important to science because listening accounts for silence 
as well as disclosure, and so maximizes the diversity in recognized perspectives that provides scientific 
objectivity (Longino 1990; 2004). 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Scientific communities are somewhat unique in demanding from individual members 
publication of new understandings and ongoing critical engagement among them, yet 
even scientists don’t disclose all their experiences and beliefs. Furthermore, science is not 
isolated but integrated to various degrees with other communities, which contributes to 
the objectivity of scientific discourse. Yet, these extra-scientific environments don’t 
enforce the same norm of disclosure, and in these other environments silence conveys a 
range of different meanings. Therefore, to draw understanding from other communities, 
science must address the various significances of silence, and employ the rhetorical skill 
of listening. Indeed, because rhetorical listening addresses both silence and disclosure, I 
argue that it is a more basic scientific value than disclosure. 
 
2. DISCLOSURE SERVES OBJECTIVITY 
 
The role of criticism in science depends on scientists disclosing their understandings. The 
availability of conflicting viewpoints is necessary for scientific objectivity, and likewise 
for objectivity in many less empirical forms of inquiry, as Helen Longino argues (1990, 
75-6). Objectivity depends on the logical publicity of science to provide criticism that is 
not available for other understandings, such as the mystical or emotional (Longino 1990, 
70). The environment in which scientists explore alternative theories, conflicting 
evidence, and various social purposes relies on the medium of a common language and 
the existence of objects that are independent of subjective individual experience. 
By contrast, outside of science we don’t expect people to disclose all of their 
experiences or understandings. Disclosure generally depends on a perceived “need to 
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know,” that is on there being a reason to share, although we do withhold information that 
is clearly valuable to others when we are competing with them or wish them not to 
succeed. Although competition among scientists encourages premature publication and 
falsification of data, which is quite destructive, such behaviour is exceptional. The 
generally characteristic lack of competition among scientists, in view of their shared 
project of creating knowledge and specific shared investigations, well may be what 
permits the scientific mandate of disclosure. 
I do not mean to support the outdated view that science is distinguished from non-
science by reasoning that involves no background assumptions (Longino 1990, 45). 
Scientists never reveal everything that they know or believe, and much personal baggage 
and belief is left at the laboratory door. Some personal beliefs actually conflict with a 
person’s scientific work. Witness creationists who also work in biology and make regular 
use of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Also, beliefs that don’t directly 
conflict with scientific assumptions are kept silent: personal views and thoughts — 
regarding one’s children’s progress in school, or a bad haircut — are put out of one’s 
mind and kept out of conversation. Sharing beliefs or experiences that are not relevant to 
the task at hand would be problematic in many ways. After all, in no context ought 
people to express every passing thought. 
Although silence is always necessary, silence in science is always in tension with 
the ongoing practice of disclosure. The expectation of disclosure is evident from the 
scandals about scientists keeping secrets and failing to disclose their findings, including 
the long history of the tobacco industry and more isolated instances like the Nancy 
Olivieri case in Toronto. Although sometimes the scandals depend on moral concerns, in 
addition, I suggest they involve epistemic matters. Cognitive concerns include in the first 
place science’s basic function to provide education; and, secondly its dependence on 
critical dialogue to provide objective understanding. Longino explains the social nature of 
objectivity: 
 
Publication in a journal does not make an idea or result a brick in the edifice of knowledge. Its 
absorption is a much more complex process, involving such things as subsequent citation, use and 
modification by others, et cetera. Experimental data and hypotheses are transformed through the 
conflict and integration of a variety of points of view into what is ultimately accepted as scientific 
knowledge (Longino 1990, 69). 
 
Therefore, “the greater the number of different points of view included in a given 
community, the more likely it is that its scientific practice will be objective.” (1990, 80) 
That is to say, the greater the range of disclosure, the greater the objectivity of the results. 
 
3. EPISTEMICALLY VIRTUOUS BIAS 
 
Ordinary experiential belief is not sufficient for scientific objectivity, which Longino 
argues requires ongoing confrontation and revelation of bias. For her some biases not 
only fill the gap between evidence and theory, they promote objectivity by revealing 
other biases, or background assumptions. Diversity of perspectives benefits scientific 
inquiry not by eliminating bias but by making biases more visible, and allowing specific 
scientific projects and individual scientists to be more accountable for their biases. This 
accountability provides the epistemic advantage that standpoint theorists argue is most 
readily available to people who oppose oppression (Hartsock 1983; Haraway 1990; 
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Hundleby 1997). For other social epistemologists, including Longino, the cognitive 
advantage of scrutinizing bias is not a matter of an individual person’s situation, 
disposition or experience, but a matter of the publicity of competing views.  
In any case, people, including scientists, are often silent about those aspects of our 
own points of view understood to be biases, especially the social and political values 
commonly viewed as negative impacts on understanding. However, personal biases of all 
sorts are considered necessary and inevitable aspects of science by many social 
epistemologists, such as Helen Longino (1990; 1994; 1997), Miriam Solomon (2001), 
Richmond Campbell (1997), and various standpoint theorists (Hartsock, 1983; Harding 
1991; Hundleby 1997). The popular argument is that bias is necessary because of the 
underdetermination of theory by data. Theoretical assumptions mediated by various 
social and political values inform all evidence claims.  
Thus, addressing silence is necessary for Longino’s “contextual empiricism” in 
which scientific objectivity directly requires “making visible” background assumptions, 
such as sexist assumptions (1997). Because “visibility” on Longino’s account depends on 
critical dialogue, and so on disclosure, it ignores the significance silence can have. 
Accounting for silence requires switching from a visual to an aural framework.  
 
4. THE SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS OF DISCLOSURE 
 
Institutional enforcement distinguishes the operation of disclosure in science. We expect 
disclosure from each other in all sorts of contexts, formal and informal. Some 
communities to which we belong, such as cities and countries and businesses, demand to 
learn things from us. The appropriateness and meaningfulness of disclosure depends 
substantially on the particular social environment, and how institutionalized it is. The 
more institutionalized, the more clear and the less negotiable are the practices regarding 
silence and disclosure. So, I argue that, as well as science’s epistemic and specifically 
empirical focus, disclosure distinguishes science among other communities partly 
because it involves specific protocols that define which sorts of information scientists 
exchange. These protocols of disclosure make sharing information an obligation and 
having it requested a distinguishing honour. 
Expectations regarding disclosure are not so clear in personal relationships, where 
the nature and extent of disclosure varies, and can be negotiated and renegotiated. 
Disclosure is extensive in personal relationships – family and friendship. So we may 
demand the truth from each other, but such demands tend to test existing social 
relationships, and sometimes to stretch and even to disrupt them. To request disclosure is 
to request a reconfiguring, or at least confirmation, of the nature of the relationship, to set 
new bounds for, or clarify, existing expectations of silence and sharing. Although if I ask 
that you to tell me about your date last week, it may be just a prompt, noting that I expect 
that sort of disclosure in our friendship, it can be a request for a new form of intimacy 
between us, a change in our relationship.  
The boundaries within which scientists expect disclosure from each other are less 
negotiable. Laboratory operations, conference procedures, publication demands, and legal 
restrictions on intellectual property establish requirements for silence and disclosure. 
Similar rigidity defines academic discourse in general, and other institutionalized forms 
of inquiry. In legal environments and businesses, for instance, there are regular protocols 
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governing what is disclosed and what kept silent. Legal summons, or one’s job 
description, can require one to disclose one’s understanding, by legal summons for 
testimony. Such protocols seem to hold generally for any and all communities and 
organizations that pursue inquiry and develop knowledge. Indeed, such epistemic 
functions of a group may depend on its scientific status. The objectivity of a community 
requires similar protocols of disclosure, such as laws, collective agreements and 
contracts. 
Nevertheless, by contrast with other institutions that develop knowledge (and all 
must to some extent), the central and dominant purpose of science is the development of 
knowledge; so, the expectation that scientists will disclose specific understandings is 
relentless. Whereas a silence of authoritative judgment or simple respect frequently greets 
legal testimony and business reports, scientific reports demand engagement. Otherwise, if 
a report receives neither challenges nor citation, the article was unworthy of publication 
or other scientists fail to find it worthwhile, and in either case science fails to progress.  
The main exception, the acceptable silence, concerns assumptions about 
scientists’ common personal background, an assumption that is warranted to various 
degrees by their similar training. Ignoring that assumption is efficient, and streamlines 
discourse, but it prevents interrogation of the assumption itself. Ignoring scientists’ 
backgrounds and personal subjectivities encourages false assumptions and discourages 
consideration of the significance of the cultural baggage carried by individual scientists, 
and by theories these scientists develop.  
In sum, disclosure is necessary for scientific objectivity, and expected because of 
institutional protocols. Protocols can be rigid and thus become ineffective if they impose 
silence over understandings that are relevant to the subject of inquiry. Or, the scientific 
function of silence, which is to set apart what is relevant to inquiry, may be the only 
recognized function of silence, projected onto other communities and cultures. People 
enculturated in the scientific functions of silence may ignore, forget or fail to realize how 
differently and flexibly silence operates in other contexts. 
In other communities, the meaning of silence is less predictable. The common 
ambiguities, fluidities and the general significance of silence contrasts with the ways that 
science and the law regulate silence and disclosure. Silence is often more than a 
background limitation on the standards for disclosure; it is a form of communication.  
 
5. THE RHETORIC OF SILENCE 
 
Silence is frequently misunderstood, especially when we assume it signifies either 
acceptance or ignorance, and hence passivity. To the contrary, respect or deference, even 
disagreement or denial, can be signalled by silence. Being silent or imposing silence can 
serve strategic purposes, as Cheryl Glenn argues in Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence 
(2004, 4-5). “Silence can deploy power; it can defer to power. It all depends.” (Glenn 
2004, xi) “In our talkative Western culture… speech is synonymous with civilization 
itself and… silence-as-obedience is frequently rewarded.” (Glenn 2004, xii) Thus, I 
suggest, our Western science may benefit from considering how silence may not mean 
acceptance, or even the obedience that passes for acceptance. Silence may in fact signify 
resistance to current scientific practices, and understanding such resistance would serve 
the objectivity of science. 
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Science institutionalizes the dominant European norms of conversation,1 and 
conversation implies equality: no interruptions, taking turns, and no silence. Yet, 
positions of power, such as science and scientists hold, provide monopolies over the floor 
and the topics, and also provide the prerogative to remain silent at will. For instance, 
contemporary science ignores eugenics for moral reasons. Outside the institution of 
science, however, in conversations with negotiable boundaries, the longer the silence the 
more it indicates that the mode of speech is failing to produce conversation and needs to 
be changed (Glenn 2004, 6). Indicating the need for conversational change is one of the 
common meanings of silence. 
Using silence effectively depends on power. The right to remain silent is 
important because silence provides power, or the ability to resist power. Glenn argues 
that the power of silence is demonstrated by the ways that former U.S. President Bill 
Clinton demanded the right to be silent about his infidelities, and in turn his wife received 
the authority to defend him. On the other hand, silence can be imposed: judges can 
require silence, and although women may speak more often than men, women are more 
frequently interrupted (Glenn 2004, 21-43). Consider how Monica Lewinsky was legally 
silenced, and the Clinton’s other partners were criticized for coming forward (Glenn 
2004, 77-106). Further, consider Anita Hill’s summonsed testimony for the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee about sexual harassment by her supervisor Clarence Thomas. (Hill 
does not herself use the words “sexual harassment”, but what she describes is -- literally -
- a textbook case.) Her choice to be silent for ten-years was treated as evidence of her 
dishonesty, although the type of public humiliation and loss of employment she 
subsequently endured obviously discourages disclosure about sexual harassment (Glenn 
2004, 52-76). In addition to Glenn’s explicitly political examples, feminists give reason 
to believe that many private activities, such as the production and consumption of 
pornography, are political because they silence women (MacKinnon 1993). 
Such cases demonstrate specifically how the effective wielding of silence depends 
on gender, race and class. People may retreat into silence to protect themselves from 
attack of various kinds, yet silence does not always provide or signal safety. Silence can 
be a symptom of oppression, simply insofar as it is a sign that people feel vulnerable; but 
it can also be part of the protocol of oppression, a way of making a group of people 
vulnerable (Glenn 2004, 43-48).  
Because silencing, or imposing silence, can be hurtful, a form of domination, 
protocols of silence are neither generally beneficial, as they are in science, where they 
frame and support institutional conversation, nor even benign. Confusion about silence is 
often warranted, and silence is notoriously and sometimes painfully ambiguous. Also, 
different ambiguities occur in different cultures, where people use silence to mean 
various different things; so, ambiguities multiply across cultures. Further, a position of 
privilege eliminates the need and discourages the desire to engage perspectives other than 
one’s own. Thus privilege impedes the ability to understand another’s silence, but science 
commands social prestige, and scientists generally have economic privilege. So both 
scientific communities and individual scientists have certain tendencies against 
understanding the various rhetorical functions of silence. This is a truly destructive form 
of bias. 
 
                                                 
1 Some European rhetorical traditions are not conversational. 
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6. FORMS OF SILENT BIAS 
 
Bias in science may be silent in various ways. Certainly some beliefs must function only 
in the background. Making assumptions is necessary, and making every assumption 
explicit is impossible. Yet scrutiny of background considerations improves the objectivity 
of knowledge, according to Longino. Discussion of the assumptions underlying a 
scientific theory requires making those assumptions visible, or audible. What cannot be 
seen or heard cannot be watched or listened to, and cannot have its role assessed. At least 
two distinct forms of silence about background assumptions affect science. The first 
concerns the background assumptions of accepted science, and the second alternative 
background assumptions.  
It can be very difficult to scrutinize or even recognize the background 
assumptions in accepted science. The human tendency to seek out like-minded views and 
avoid dissenting views is known as the “confirmation bias.” In addition, when people in a 
group share the same biases, they are likely to reinforce each other’s bias. So, considering 
how the views of individuals may be distorted by shared biases becomes an issue of 
epistemic responsibility, as Hilary Kornblith (1995) argues. Yet shared biases become 
reinforced by scientific practice, as Kathleen Okruhlik (1995) argues: thorough testing of 
scientific theories only entrenches sociopolitical assumptions if that testing is never 
against theories supported by contrasting background beliefs. So, if only men in 
patriarchal cultures develop scientific theories, the result will be sexist science. Even if 
the culture is more diverse, as it certainly is, the confirmation bias entails that dissenting 
views are still rarely considered, and there is a tendency to homogeneity in outlook. The 
result is that science tends to preserve existing dominant background views. Even if 
nonsexist views are available in a scientific culture with a patriarchal heritage, they are 
unlikely to receive serious consideration. Alternatives are likely to be silent or silenced, 
and difficult to develop. 
Silence does not necessarily indicate passive agreement or lack of understanding. 
Instead, politeness or deference, resignation to voicelessness, and even fear can mask 
dissent. Dissenters may feel threatened, especially if the dissent in any way resonates 
with their membership in a social minority, and they may retreat into the relative safety of 
silence (Glenn 2004). Finally, many scientists at home in the culture of disclosure — 
which they must be to some extent because of their scientific training – will have 
difficulty understanding and recognizing the potential to misunderstand how socially 
marginalized people use silence. This problem is exacerbated if their scientific training 
dovetails with their own European heritage. 
How do we counteract the regressive misunderstandings of silence and the 
invisibility of background assumptions? Interaction between scientific and other 
communities, for instance communities of other professions and ethnic cultures and 
genders, provides valuable diversity in background assumptions that counteracts the 
confirmation bias. Western scientists have fairly uniform training complete with the 
European rhetorical heritage. Other communities become involved, however, in scientific 
work, when scientists deal with research ethicists, lawyers, plumbers, and even their own 
family members. These others may be better able than scientists themselves to critique 
the background assumptions of scientists because they are less vulnerable to the 
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confirmation bias as it operates in science. Therefore, they can contribute to the 
objectivity of science.  
In these other environments, expressing or even developing one’s own view is 
only sometimes encouraged to the extent it is in scientific communities. Certainly lawyers 
share a similar culture; they are forthcoming with their views, which may be attributed to 
the European rhetoric of disclosure. This aspect of European heritage clearly provides 
effective means for inquiry, and I don’t mean to suggest that we need to change the 
central practices of science or the law. But we do need to think a bit more about the 
underlying values, about what exactly makes the norm of disclosure serve objectivity and 
the limits of that service. Disclosure facilitates confrontation among competing beliefs, 
but confrontation is not the universally effective means to advance understanding that 
many of us – including philosophers especially (Moulton 1983) – tend to assume it is. 
Regulated disclosure is the exception, especially as scientists engage with non-
European cultures, and across lines of oppression, such as race, gender and sexuality. In 
other contexts what is disclosed is much more subject to negotiation. So, to obtain 
disclosure, scientists must consider what it serves, and find common ground with silence, 
a basis for trust that is provided by the rhetoric of listening. 
 
7. CONCLUSION: THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF RHETORICAL LISTENING 
 
The information conveyed by silence may be recognized only through careful listening 
practices. Understanding the rhetoric of silence, and developing rhetorical skill at 
listening, is necessary to recognize relevant silence: the silence that involves dissent or 
consent, trust and mistrust, all of which affect the objectivity of science. Ultimately, 
listening is a more basic scientific value than disclosure because listening addresses both 
the disclosure typical of science and the various forms of silence that can affect scientific 
inquiry. 
Listening may seem to be unnecessary because the protocols of science govern 
what needs to be disclosed. However, the boundaries of disclosure are less clear outside 
of communities of inquiry such as science, and these communities affect the background 
assumptions of scientists, and in the social sciences the background assumptions of 
subjects. Scientists need to be sensitive to the rhetoric of silence, and develop rhetorical 
skill at listening in order to maximize objectivity and counteract the confirmation bias.  
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